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Takings and Water Rights
The Nature of Property in Water
A.

Riparian rights are private interests appurtenant to real property that allow
reasonable use of water correlatively with other property owners.
1.

The right does not depend on use; new uses may commence at any time
resulting in initiation or expansion of a use

2.

The proprietor may use any quantity of water that is reasonable relative to
the uses of other riparians.

3.

In times of shortage, uses may be curtailed to accommodate the uses of all
riparians.

4.
B.

Rights exist only to the extent of "reasonable" use of water.

Appropriative rights allow use of the resource for specified purposes according to
a system of priorities.
1.

Rights exist only to the extent that a "beneficial use" is made of the water.

2.

Unappropriated water is public property.

3.

In times of shortage, the oldest uses are served; newer uses must abate to
the extent that the water they do not use would be available to senior
users.

C.

Permit rights define allocate and define terms and conditions for use of water.
1.

Quantities, purposes, and other terms may be specified.

2.

Riparian principles of sharing shortages or restricting the place of use may
apply.

3.

Appropriative principles of priority and loss for nonuse may apply.

4.

The permit may be renewable or have a term that expires with or without
a preference right to renew.

5.

Changes require approval of a permitting agency.

D. All water rights, whether riparian or appropriative, are merely usufructuary so
that the "property" is in the right to use and not in the corpus of flowing water.
Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights in the Nineteen Western States (Riparian: vol. II,
1

pages 23-27; Appropriative: vol. I, page 442).
1.

Flowing water is not subject to private ownership.

2.

Natural streamflow belongs to the public. 1 Samuel Charles Wiel, Water
Rights in the Western States §63 (3d ed. 1911); I Waters and Water Rights
§4.05, pp. 68-69 (Robert Beck, ed. 1991).

II.

Takings Challenges Based on Legislative Changes in Water Law
A.

When states convert from a riparian system to prior appropriation it can deprive
riparian owners of valuable interests in their lands.
1.

Making streams subject to appropriation and allowing appropriative rights
to be exercised to the detriment of riparians has been upheld. In re Hood
River, 227 P.24 1065 (Or. 1924). See also Wasserburger v. Coffee, 141
N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966)(riparians are protected against "unreasonable"
uses of appropriators).

2.

Departure from property rules established by prior case law is not a
taking. Thus, a state has power "to modify or reject the doctrine of
riparian rights because unsuited to the conditions in the state and to put
into force the doctrine of prior appropriation and application to beneficial
use or reasonable use." Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F.Supp. 617, 624
(D.Kan.), affd., 352 U.S. 863 (1956).

B.

Changes from common law riparian or appropriation rights to statutory systems
can result in loss or diminishment of existing rights.
1. States have required rights to be quantified through adjudication, typically
extinguishing rights that have not been used as of the date of adjudication
or within some specified period.
a.

California requires adjudication of all rights on stream systems
before the State Water Resources Control Board. The Board
(under authority delegated by the legislature) has authority to
define and limit future riparian rights consistent with promoting
reasonable and beneficial use. In re Waters ottong Valley Creek,
2

faiN

599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979XBoard may remove priority of future
riparian rights, subordinating them to all uses commenced before
they are actually used, but may not extinguish the rights altogether.
b.

In upholding Washington's statute that converted the state from
riparian law to prior appropriation while preserving riparian rights
in use, the state supreme court said that tights unexercised when
the law was passed in 1917 were also preserved if they were put to
use within a "reasonable period." Brown v. Chase, 217 P. 23
(Wash. 1923). Later, the court said that 15 years was a sufficient
period to give riparians notice and satisfy the constitution. Matter
of Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985).

c.

The Texas Supreme Court overruled a lower court that had
declared unconstitutional a law that limited riparian rights to those
put to use during the period 1963-67. In re Adjudication of the
Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982).

d.

South Dakota passed a statute that recognized riparian rights as
vested only "to the extent of the existing beneficial use." The state
supreme court upheld the law as within the state's power to
provide for the "maximum utilization of the waters of the state."
Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist v. Smiley, 176 N.W.2d 239 (S.D.

1970); accord Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
Earlier, the South Dakota held a prior appropriation statute
unconstitutional on due process grounds, saying that it resulted in a
taking of riparian rights. St Germain Irr. Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch
Co., 143 N.W. 572 (S.D. 1913).

e.

Kansas' law restricting vested riparian rights to those actually
instituted at the time the legislation was passed and requiring state
approval for any new uses was upheld in State v. Knapp, 207 P.2d

440 (Kan. 1949).
2.

Statutes that require registration or adjudication of appropriative rights
also are upheld as within state police power.
a.

Failure to register appropriative rights within time set by statute
caused rights to be relinquished. This was upheld as consistent
with furthering the beneficial use of water and thus was not a
compensable taking. Washington Department of Ecology v. Ac/sit,
694 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1985).

3.

Overlying landowner's interest in groundwater does not prevent limitation
or restriction on use.
a.

Law requiring permits for development of groundwater underlying
land did not take rights from overlying owner because state has
control of unappropriated water. F. Arthur Stone & Sons v.
Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981).

b.

Right to use groundwater based on overlying land ownership does
not preclude changes in law that allow other water users to
develop water from the same source and thereby to interfere with
owner's uses because there is no right of private ownership in the
water itself and therefore can be no taking. Williams v. City of
Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962); Town of Chino Valley v. City
of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324 (Ariz. 1981).

III.

Judicial Decisions as the Basis for Takings Claims
A.

A court decision that effectively redefines water rights, thereby destroying all
value in a previously vested right theoretically could raise due process questions.

B.

Virtually no cases have raised the issue and the Supreme Court has not found that
the judicial redefinition of property amounts to a taking.
1.

The issue is fully and thoughtfully explored in Barton Thompson, Judicial
Takings, 76 Va. L.Rev. 1449 (1990).

2.

The Hawaii Supreme Court overruled a series of cases spanning a century
4

to hold in 1973 that the prior law of water rights was no longer effective
and that riparian law prevailed. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson. 504
P.2d 1330 (flaw. 1973). The Ninth Circuit upheld the ability of the court
to change the common law so far as it affected future rights. Insofar as
rights were already vested, by compliance with and reliance upon preexisting law, they remained vested and they could only be divested
through condemnation upon payment of just compensation. Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.1985), remanded, 477 U.S. 902 (1982),
opinion vacated, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cit. 1989).
IV. Regulation of Water Use as a Taking
A.

Destruction or expropriation of the landowner's riparian right to make reasonable
use of water.
1.

Existing uses
Where legislature enacted statute conditioning use of navigable
waterway for dams upon agreement to surrender the site and facilities at
less than their market value there was no due process violation because
the state may define the nature of the property rights of riparians and of
the state in navigable waters. Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 274 U.S. 651 (1927).

2.

Future uses

Limitation on the amounts of water that may be used for particular purposes.
1.

Several states have duty-of-water statutes limiting the quantity of water or
rate at which it can be applied.
a.

Washington has upheld imposition of a duty-of-water limitation
that reduced the existing water rights claimed by the plaintiffs.
The portion of the right not used efficiently (i.e., within the duty of
water) was not used beneficially and reverted back to the state.
Because beneficial use is a limitation on all water rights this was
not a taking. Washington Department of Ecology v. Grimes, 852
5

P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993).
b.

Nebraska passed several such laws beginning around the turn of
the century; one said that the maximum rate for irrigation
application was one cubic foot per second and another said the
maximum annual quantity for irrigation was three acre-feet per
acre. The laws all said that they were not to "impair the rights to
water appropriated and acquired prior to" 1895, the date of the first
such law. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the limitations
were unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs 1889 right.
Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 284 N.W. 326 (Neb. 1939). The
court acknowledged that the beneficial use doctrine limits the
amount an appropriator can put to use which, in the case of
irrigation, is "a quantity of water necessary, when economically
conducted and applied to the land without unnecessary loss, as will
result in the successful growing of crops." The court said that
while vested water rights may be interfered with within
reasonable limits under the police power of the state to
secure a proper regulation and supervision of them for the
public good, any interference that limits the quantity of
water or changes the date of its priority to the material
injury of its holder is . . . a deprivation of a vested right.
In this case there was unrefuted evidence that the plaintiff
required more water to produce crops "in the usual and ordinary

•

way," and that there had been no "no waste or misapplication."
Thus, the legislature's arbitrary numerical limitation on the amount
of water to be used could not be justified.

C.

Denial or conditioning of permit to use federal project water.
1.
•

Where no absolute rights survive the creation of an irrigation district, a
water users rights will be determined by the terms of the contract with the
district E.g., Nelson v. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist, 845 F.Supp. 1362
(D.S.D. 1994).
6

Contracts to use federal project water do not create any vested property

2.

right and are subject to changes in federal law that restrict water use.
Peterson v. United States Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th
Cir. 1990).
3.

Federal law that prevents development of a water right in the manner
contemplated (i.e., effectively precluding issuance of a FERC license)
does not effect a taking. Broughton Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 Fed.
Cl. 239 (1994).

D.

Restrictions on groundwater pumping are regularly upheld as a means of
preventing waste. E.g., Kline v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Water Resources Board,
759 P.2d 210 (Okla. 1988).

E.

Limitations on the quality of returns that prevent an appropriator from using
water in an amount or in a manner so as to carry out the specified beneficial
purpose of the right may be upheld.
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected a taking claim based on the
restrictions inarNPDES (water pollution) permits that prevented continued use
of sluice boxes by placer miners and thereby diminished property values. erret

F.

II

II •

:

'

:

••

•

I'

M.• il•

Restrictions on land use that indirectly prevent the beneficial of water.
1.

Private land

2.

Public land
In Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. F.Supp.1113 (D.Nev.), affirmed, 963 F.2d 275

(9th Cir. 1989), BLM required grazing allottee to allow wild horses to have free
access to plaintiffs watering hole thereby monopolizing it and excluding plaintiff
from using the water right for cattle. BLM had effectively expropriated the full
value of the water right for a public use. The court set aside the government's
action preventing plaintiff from fencing the watering hole but did not grant
compensation.
G.

Limitations on the type of diversion, conveyance, or distribution (irrigation)
7

works that may be used.

V.

H.

Restrictions on the type or manner of water use.

I.

Denial or subordination of the priority of an appropriator.

A Suggested Analysis for Determining Whether There is a Compensable Regulatory
Taking
A.

Has the regulation destroyed or damaged the property right in water use?
1.

Most regulations of water use do not destroy the ability of the holder to
put the right to a beneficial use.
a.

Because the property right extends only to making a "beneficial
use," there is no right to waste water or to use water inefficiently.
Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
(1992Xno property right in land to carry on nuisance-type
äbvitiösJ

b.

—

What is "beneficial" should be construed relative to the alternative
of holding the unappropriated water for the public generally — the

c.

status of all water prior to a grant of water rights to a private
.„.
party.
Beneficial use is flexible and dynamic so that holders of property
rights.should expect,whatispermissibteniainge. "[W]hat is a
reasonable use or a beneficial use in 1890 may not be so in 1990."
I Waters and Water Rights §4.01, p. 68 (Robert Beck, ed. 1991). It
is in the very nature of the water right that the state may redefine
it, Fox River, supra, and regulate its use to ensure that it is
beneficial. See Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title
Itself The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26

Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 943 (1993); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U.Colo.L.Rev.

257 (1990Xarguing that the traditions of change and of public
servitudes in water law create an expectation of public control of
8

water rights).

rTh
d.

The state legislature or courts may change the law so long as it
arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, and is not a "sudden
change. . . unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents." See

Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290,296 (1967XStewart, J.,
concurring).
2.

If the water right holder can still put the water to a beneficial use as
defined by state law, that ends the matter. There is no need to get into the
Supreme Court's cases on takings.
Note that some commentators have argued that each and every
characteristic attributable to a water right — quantity, priority, place and
manner of appropriation, access to source, right to change uses,
continuation of stream conditions at time of appropriation, alienability -is itself an indispensable part of the right which, if significantly limited
may trigger a takings analysis. David C. Hallford, Environmental

Regulations as Water Rights Takings, 6 Nat. Resources and Environment
13 (1991); Gregory J. Hobbs and Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights
Protection, in Water Qualitylaw,-604JColotRev. 841 (1989). See also,
Jan G. Laitos, Constitutional Limits on Police Power Regulations
Affecting the Exercise of Water Rights, 16 Colo. Law. 1626 (1987).
3.

If the water right holder is no longer able to make a beneficial use of the
water, the right has been destroyed or damaged and the next question must
be addressed.

B.

Does the regulation substantially advance legitimate state interests?

e,th,941

"[A]ll property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause
did not transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the
State asserts its power to enforce it." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.

DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491-92 (1987).
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1.

If not, it is an unconstitutional taking.

2.

If so, it is necessary to go to the next question.

Has the beneficial use been expropriated or transferred to another for a public
purpose as a consequence of the regulation?
1.

If so, there is a compensable taking. This is tantamount to a "physical
invasion" that dedicates private property to a public use. Loretto
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); No//an v.
California Coastal Commit:, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

2.

If not, there may still be a compensable taking depending on the answers
to the next question.

D.

Does the regulation deny the holder of all economically viable use of the water
right?
ro

I"

'

.

If not there is no taking.
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A Suggested Approach to Analyzing Regulatory Takings Claims
David H. Getches

Property Right?

NO

------ >

NO taking

i

yes

Reg’n Substantially
Advances Legitimate
State Interest?

Either:
1) “Physical invasion”
(Others get right to use)?
or
2) All economically
viable use destroyed?

NO

------ >

NO Taking

yes
Consistent with
“Background principles”?
(common law; reasonable
expectations; balancing;
changed circumstances)

Compensable
Taking

NO

yes

->

---->

NO taking

